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Claire Priest, Currency Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New
England, 110 YALE L.J. 1303 (2001).
Claire Priest makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the
relationship between law and the economy in early New England in her
recent article in these pages.' By drawing our attention to the obscure but
nonetheless important subject of colonial currency policies and by
demonstrating a correlation between currency instability and litigation
volume, she adds a previously unexplored strand to the generally accepted
explanation of how and why law changed in the eighteenth century-an
explanation I first put forward fifteen years ago.' This by itself would be a
worthy accomplishment. Priest, however, aspires to more. She argues that
the prevailing interpretation of legal change in early New England is wrong
and offers her account in its place. One can hardly deny the appeal of
erecting a new edifice rather than adding to an existing one. Unfortunately,
Priest misrepresents the scholarship she purports to overturn. More
unfortunately still, as a stand-alone interpretation of legal change, her
account drains the field of much of its nuance by removing society from the
triad of law, economy, and society. In this brief reply, I demonstrate where
Priest went wrong and suggest how she could have gotten it right had she
not overreached.
f Professor of Law and History, University of Pennsylvania.
1. Claire Priest, Currency Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New England, 110
YALE L.J. 1303 (2001).
2. BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY
CONNECTICUT (1987).
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The core of Priest's contribution is her analysis of debt litigation in
Plymouth County, Massachusetts, from 1718 to 1751, in which she
establishes a correlation between rises and falls in the volume of debt
litigation and periods of decrease and increase in the supply and value of
paper currency.3 As she recognizes, demonstration of an empirical fact,
however interesting in itself, is but a first step toward explaining how and
why it occurred and what its significance is. It is here that she goes astray.
To Priest, the data prove that "the legal and economic changes of the first
half of the eighteenth century in New England did not emerge
endogenously out of individuals' obligations, shaped by local conditions
and enforced by local courts," but rather from "the effort by colonial
legislatures to expand their powers and to gain control over the economy by
issuing the first paper currencies and by taxing in paper currency." 4 She
argues that previous legal historians have erred by focusing on "judicial
decisionmaking" as "the best means of assessing the role of law in
economic development" and that this focus has led them to the false
conclusion that "judges actively promoted an agenda in harmony with local
preferences" -that is, "optimally satisfying the legal needs of local
communities." 5 The errant legal historians fall into two camps, each wrong
but for different reasons. The first is led by Morton Horwitz, who
highlighted what he regarded as the dynamic instrumentalism of nineteenth-
century judges by dismissing law in the colonial period as static and bound
by the anticommercial values of an agrarian, communitarian society.6 The
second camp is a group that Priest labels "modernization theorists"-
primarily Cornelia Dayton and myself.' According to Priest, Dayton and I
argued that, whereas judges in the seventeenth century "tailored their
decisions to individual litigants and to the relationship between the parties
underlying the transaction," judges in the eighteenth century "began to
apply more formal and predictable legal rules" in response to economic
growth, thereby promoting "even further economic development." 8 Our
evidence for this, in Priest's characterization, is statistics that show an
exponential rise in the volume of civil litigation, attributable primarily to an
increase in debt litigation, which we claim "accompanied a process of legal
formalization and was a function of economic advance and
commercialization." 9 This is the "modernization hypothesis-economic
3. See Priest, supra note 1, at 1387-93 figs.4-6.
4. Id. at 1310-11.
5. Id. at 1305.
6. See MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977).
7. See CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW, AND
SOCIETY IN CONNECTICUT, 1639-1789 (1995); MANN, supra note 2.
8. Priest, supra note 1, at 1307.
9. Id. at 1309.
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growth leading to greater legal predictability and resulting in exponential
increases in litigation" 10 -that Priest purports to disprove." The problem is
that this modernization hypothesis is a straw of Priest's creation. It is
neither mine nor Dayton's, and it bears little relationship to how we used
our data.
I wrote Neighbors and Strangers in part to rescue the legal history of
the colonial period from the communal, preindustrial irrelevance to which it
had been consigned by legal historians from Roscoe Pound to Willard Hurst
to Horwitz, none of whom paid it much attention before dismissing it. I
began with a statistical sample of over five thousand civil cases drawn from
seven decades of litigation in early Connecticut, which I used to revise the
then-standard periodization of legal change in American history by placing
early in the eighteenth century many of the changes that Horwitz and
William Nelson had attributed to the Revolution and its aftermath." What
my data showed was that civil litigation changed dramatically within a
relatively short period during the first half of the eighteenth century. Debt
litigation changed from a world in which most of the debts sued upon were
contracted on book accounts to one in which most arose from formal
written credit instruments, primarily promissory notes, and from a world in
which most debtors contested their creditors' claims when sued to one in
which they did not. At the same time, fewer contested civil cases of all
kinds, debt included, were decided by juries and more by judges, and the
structure of pleadings changed such that fewer defendants staked their fates
on pleas of fact and more on pleas of law.
13
I argued that some of these changes-those involving debt-were
closely tied to the growing commercialization of the economy and to the
changing social context of economic relations, while others-pleading and
procedure---owed less to shifts in economy or society and more to the
tendency of a fledgling legal profession to treat law as an autonomous
system rather than as a contingent social process.' 4 Taken together, I
argued, these changes marked a transformation in the relationship between
law and community as the formal legal system grew, in effect, less
communal-that is, more formalistic and less accommodating to the
vagaries and eccentricities of individual disputes."
Priest reduces my argument to the claims that judges, acting
instrumentally to promote economic growth, engineered the legal changes,
and that economic growth in turn produced increasing legal modernization,
10. Id. at 1310.
11. Id. at 1306-10.
12. See HORWITz, supra note 6; WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON
LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975).
13. MANN, supra note 2, at 11-46, 67-100.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 164-69.
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primarily in the two decades from 1730 to 1750, as evidenced by a sharply
rising volume of litigation. 6 In truth, neither Dayton nor I imputed any such
role to judges, who in fact barely appear in Dayton's book. 17 I did not
attribute legal change to economic growth, nor did I pay more than
incidental attention to the volume of litigation, let alone regard it as
evidence of legal change. And I identified the pivotal period of legal change
as the years 1710 to 1720.18
Litigation volume is hardly a measure of legal change, which is why I
gave it little consideration other than to note that debt litigation increased
sharply in the 1730s and 1740s.' 9 None of the sixteen statistical tables in the
appendix to Neighbors and Strangers tracks litigation volume as its primary
purpose. All of them present percentage distributions-whether of forms of
debt actions, rates of contest, differences between intratown and intertown
actions and among types of towns, kinds of defendants' initial pleas, or
modes of decision.2" The actual number of cases in each table appears only
,as the statistical "n" to inform the reader of the size of the sample.
2 1
Similarly, when Dayton offered data on the number of cases in each decade,
she did so to track the percentage of cases involving women as litigants." I
ignored litigation volume as an area of substantive inquiry in part because
to discuss it accurately across time requires controlling for changes in
population, for which too few reliable figures are available.23 But my
primary reason was that I was interested in legal change, not in how often
people sued one another. I wanted to explain why, in a legal world in which
all of the individual pieces-book accounts, bonds, bills, promissory notes,
judges, juries, general denials, pleas in bar, pleas in abatement, and
demurrers-were available throughout the period under study, people chose
to contract their debts and litigate their disputes one way at the beginning of
the period and a quite different way at the end.
That change had very little to do with judges. Judges did not determine
whether debtors and creditors used book accounts or formal written credit
instruments to memorialize their legal obligations. They did not determine
16. Priest, supra note 1, at 1307-09, 1315.
17. Tarring Dayton with this brush is particularly unfair. Women Before the Bar is a fine
study of how and why women's roles in courts declined from the seventeenth century to the
Revolution across a broad range of legal actions, including divorce, rape, illicit sex, slander, and
debt. Legal change of the kind Priest wants to explain holds only incidental interest for Dayton.
18. MANN, supra note 2, at 171 tbl.1, 183-86 tbls.13-16.
19. Id. at 62-63. Dayton made the same observation. DAYTON, supra note 7, at 90-9 1.
20. MANN, supra note 2, at 171-86 tbls.l-16.
21. id.
22. See DAYTON, supra note 7, at 84-85 tbls.1-2.
23. The lack of population figures did not deter Priest, who did not bother to control for
changes in population, which were substantial. The population of Massachusetts increased from
roughly 94,000 to 96,000 in 1718 to 245,000 by the 1765 census. See EVARTS B. GREENE &
VIRGINIA D. HARRINGTON, AMERICAN POPULATION BEFORE THE FEDERAL CENSUS OF 1790, at
15, 21 (1932). Her litigation figures are thus not comparable across time.
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whether debtors chose to defend themselves on factual grounds or legal
ones. They did not determine whether debtors elected to put their cases to
the bench or a jury for decision. And when they did decide cases, they did
not articulate the reasons for their decisions. Thus, when Priest asserts that
"the assumption that judges continually adapted the law to satisfy local
preferences optimally is misguided," 24 1 agree, but the assumption is neither
mine nor Dayton's, despite her attribution.
In her determination to prove that colonial legislatures played a greater
role in legal change through their currency policies than did courts, Priest
confuses judges with the courts themselves. Courts in early America
encompassed more than judges. They were fora for the resolution of
disputes populated by litigants, witnesses, jurors, judges, lawyers, and
spectators-all of whom had parts to play in the proceedings. Thus, when
Dayton and I used court records to study legal change, we were not looking
only or even primarily at judges. We were interested instead in the litigants,
in the social and economic relations that underlay their disputes, and in the
choices they had and made in pursuing their claims or defending
themselves. Some of those choices expanded, and some narrowed, the
participation of judges in the process. The role judges played in legal
change was determined largely by others.
The crux of Priest's dismissal of my explanation of legal change is her
claim that I attributed the change to economic growth, which she says could
not be true because the economy did not grow appreciably during the period
in which the change occurred."5 Although I did make one or two offhand
references to economic growth,26 throughout Neighbors and Strangers I
made it clear that the key economic factor in the formal changes in how
people contracted debts was the growing commercialization of the
economy." Priest treats economic growth and commercialization as
24. Priest, supra note 1, at 1316.
25. See id. at 1339-42. As Priest at least partly recognizes, the question of how to define and
measure economic growth in the eighteenth century has long bedeviled historians and economists.
Some have equated prosperity with economic growth and measured household wealth using
taxable estates and probate inventories. Others have computed annual per capita exports from
Great Britain to New England. Still others have attempted to construct comparative price indices.
One can conclude, as the best recent scholarship does, that the New England economy largely
stagnated or grew little by these measures in the first half of the eighteenth century, with
occasional spurts of localized growth, without addressing such important economic questions as
whether more people were participating in the economy, whether they were doing so across
greater internal distances, and whether their economic activities were becoming more
differentiated. Economics can change in many ways. The best general analysis of the colonial
economies, JOHN J. MCCUSKER & RUSSELL R. MENARD, THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH AMERICA,
1607-1789 (1985), is also the most aware of the complexity of the subject and of the work that
remains to be done.
26. See MANN, supra note 2, at 31, 126.
27. E.g., id. at 9 ("Some of the changes were closely tied to the growing commercialization
of the economy and to the changing social context of economic relations."); id. at 164 ("In the
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synonymous. They are not. Commercialization refers to a set of practices
and values that may accompany economic growth but are not dependent
upon it.
Here is the change I described. It bears recounting because it illustrates
how social change intersects with legal and economic change and because it
offers a way to appreciate the contribution Priest does make. The most
striking feature of civil litigation in the colonial period is the predominance
of debt cases, which often comprised ninety percent or more of all civil
actions.28 This reflects a centrality of credit in colonial society that modem
Americans would find familiar. On the evidence of court records, most of
that credit was extended in the form of book-debt transactions until the
beginning of the eighteenth century.29 Book debts were, in effect, running
accounts receivable, without the monthly billings. They had center stage in
an economy that had little hard currency and where income was tied to the
uncertainties of harvests and the sea. Given the chronic scarcity of cash,
people used agricultural produce as money, referring to it as "commodity
money." Book accounts facilitated such transactions by allowing debtors to
purchase goods or services on credit, with payment postponed until they
could harvest their crops or otherwise acquire commodity money items."
Priest regards commodity money and book debt as forms of barter
exchange and the economy in which they prevailed as a barter economy.31
They were not. Agricultural produce was a medium of exchange, not the
object of the transaction. People figured their book accounts in pounds,
shillings, and pence, not in bushels, pecks, and weights. Debtors and
creditors thought in monetary terms and used as money the most valuable
items at hand, agricultural produce. Priest knows this. In her initial
discussion she differentiates between commodity money exchanges, which
she refers to as "quasi-barter," and true barter.32 But thereafter she
repeatedly refers to the pre-paper-currency economy as a "barter
economy," to commodity money and book debt as part of a "barter
regime," and to any transaction made without paper money or specie as
"barter." 3 3 Such characterizations convey an entirely misleading image of
people trading for beads and trinkets, which bears no relationship to the
debtors who paid their book debts with commodity money. This was not, as
large area of debt litigation, the changes were closely tied to commercialization of the economy
and to the changing social context of economic relations.").
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id. at 171 tbl.I.
30. On book debt generally, see id. at 13-27.
31. Priest, supra note 1, at 1318-32.
32. d. at 1312.
33. E.g., id. at 1312-14, 1329, 1334, 1353, 1355, 1374, 1376, 1390, 1395, 1397. I should note
that I slipped once and referred to "barter transactions" myself. MANN, supra note 2, at 30.
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Priest would have it, "an economy without money." ' It was an economy
without paper money. It was an economy that was chronically short on
specie. But it was not an economy without money. This is an important
point to make because without it one cannot understand how economic
actors before the spread of paper currency viewed their transactions or
understand the extent to which they embraced commercial values and
pursued profit.
In legal terms, the defining features of book debt were that it did not
contain an explicit promise by the debtor to pay the amounts listed, and it
did not stipulate a time for payment. Instead, it created an obligation for
which the law implied a promise to pay. Priest recognizes the important
role book accounts played in credit, but she mistakenly asserts that to
"obtain a book account credit, a person had to offer to repay the debt in
terms acceptable to the creditor." 31 One can certainly assume that creditors
would not extend credit on book if they did not believe that their debtors
would eventually repay them, but the accounts themselves contained no
such promise. Any discussion of the terms of payment came at the time of
payment-that is, at the end of the credit relationship, not the beginning.
Relying as they did on a creditor's willingness to extend credit to
people who did not expressly bind themselves to repay the debt, book
accounts implied a measure of trust between creditor and debtor. Although
this may strike us as a rather vague and risky basis for credit relations, it
functioned adequately when creditors and debtors knew one another and
knew what to expect from one another. Not surprisingly, most book-debt
actions linked residents of the same town or county.36 Book accounts were
in part a function of community, where neighbors readily knew enough
about one another to decide if they would deal on book. They were also
common in long-distance transactions between traders and merchants
whose expectations of one another rested on a course of dealing or on
trusted recommendations. Where those assurances did not exist, whether
within communities or across greater distances, credit took the very
different form of bonds, bills, or promissory notes.
Priest argues the contrary-that the "[relations of trust" and
"community-oriented consciousness" reflected in book accounts were "a
response to currency scarcity" and "represent[ed] efforts to overcome it in
order to promote exchange,"' 31 thereby implying that the sense of
community described by historians among neighbors who worshiped
together every Sunday, who knew one another's affairs intimately, who
supplied one another with goods and services, and whose children married
34. Priest, supra note 1, at 1312.
35. Id. at 1335.
36. E.g., MANN, supra note 2, at 17 n.12.
37. Priest, supra note 1, at 1336.
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one another would never have existed but for a shortage of coin or paper
money. She also argues that book debt and commodity money exchanges
"confined commercial transactions to relatively insular communities,"" as
though mere currency would have overcome poor transportation networks,
rocky soil, low population density, the high cost of labor relative to land,
and every other impediment to the production of a commercial surplus, and
propelled people into a wider economic world. The lack of specie or a
stable paper currency undoubtedly had economic effects, but it constrained
Atlantic trade much more than it did internal trade, which seems to have
operated about as well in the seventeenth century as physical circumstances
would permit. This is not to contend that a circulating medium of exchange
is not important to an economy, only that it cannot bear the weight Priest
places on it.
As the eighteenth century dawned, book debt embodied the credit that
ran the local economy in Connecticut. Within a generation, however, it had
fallen from favor and been replaced by formal written credit instruments-
bills obligatory, bonds, and, ultimately, promissory notes. According to my
data, the shift began in the second decade of the century and was largely
complete by the fourth, when promissory notes predominated.39 This is the
legal change I associated with the growing commercialization of the
economy. As I explained in Neighbors and Strangers, it coincided with the
advent and spread of paper money, which I regarded as both a cause and a
symptom of economic transformation.' In this respect Priest and I agree,
although she seems not to have noticed that I discussed the importance of
the introduction of paper money to the legal changes I identified.4 I argued
that the appearance of paper money signaled growing involvement in a
commercial economy. Whether or not that economy grew in Priest's terms,
it did change. Internal trade expanded in response to rapid population
growth and the supply requirements of periodic military expeditions to
Canada and against the Indians. As the rate of population growth
38. Id. at 1335.
39. See MANN, supra note 2, at 171 tbl.1.
40. Id at 30.
41. Priest notes that I placed the initial shift from book-debt actions to actions on written
credit instruments, together with the other legal changes I identified, in the decade from 1710 to
1720, and asserts that I attributed the change to "an expanding economy," by which she means
economic growth. Priest, supra note 1, at 1396 n.353. (Actually, she states that I placed the shift
between 1700 and 1720, but as the tables of mine to which she refers begin in 1710, I assume she
means the decade from 1710 to 1720.) She then states that since the economy did not grow, and
since that decade also witnessed "the widespread circulation of paper money," a better
explanation-hers-is that "the transfornaion to greater use of formal credit instruments is most
plausibly a direct result of the widespread circulation of paper money," which "allowed greater
use of cash in exchanges." Id. This is, in fact, a close variant of an argument I made in Neighbors
and Strangers, MANN, supra note 2, at 30-33, which Priest nowhere acknowledges. I mention this
not to claim pride of place, but because Priest offers it as a key rebuttal to the modernization
hypothesis she has invented and attributed to me and others.
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outstripped the availability of new land for settlement, the resulting
pressure encouraged more specialized cultivation to adapt to the different
types of land, which in turn led to commercial farming. With more products
available for export, secondary ports and market towns grew to
accommodate the demands for markets and transportation. In fact, the
Connecticut economy did grow briefly during this period, although it
subsequently stagnated, but growth was not the most important factor in
legal change--commercialization was: people trading across greater
distances, credit networks that began to snake through the countryside, the
specialization of business enterprise, farmers and craftsmen trading on the
side, artisans supporting themselves solely or primarily by their crafts.
Paper money was an important part-but only a part--of this
commercialization .42
This was a shift of enormous consequence. In pure litigation terms,
written credit instruments sharply limited the debtor's options. Whereas the
procedure in book-debt actions was simple and flexible, with each party
free to offer whatever evidence he or she thought relevant to the dispute, the
debtor's liability on written obligations rested primarily on whether the
instrument itself met the legal requirements of form. Debtors could not
plead that there had been a mistake or that they were entitled to a set-off or
that they had intended something other than what they had signed or that
the creditor had promised forbearance. The greater certainty with which
written credit instruments embodied debt obligations, and the consequent
reduction in the procedural and evidentiary wiggle room left to debtors
when sued, facilitated commercial transactions over longer distances and
between people who did not know one another well. Written credit
instruments offered an alternative to the quirky individuality of open-ended
book accounts-a way of extending credit that admitted fewer questions
about who owed what to whom and when. One mark of how well written
credit instruments could provide this assurance was that, unlike book
accounts, they were assignable-an essential feature in a proper credit
system, which requires that debts be transferable. Notes, bills, and bonds
were instruments of an increasingly commercialized economy.43
Two quantifiable measures that helped persuade me that written credit
instruments were part of the commercialization of the economy were their
greater geographical reach and the fact that debtors did not contest most of
the actions brought on them. When written instruments first appeared in
42. MANN, supra note 2, at 30-33.
43. Id. at 35-39. I am aware that this leaves me open to a charge that I committed the
functionalist fallacy rightly criticized by Robert W. Gordon, see Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984), and Priest does make the charge, see Priest, supra note 1,
at 1404, but I believe I presented my argument with enough qualifications and awareness of the
complexities that the charge applies only to a caricature of it.
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litigation in significant numbers in the second decade of the eighteenth
century, nearly two-thirds linked debtors and creditors from different
towns, whereas virtually all of the book-debt actions were intratown
affairs.' This suggested to me that when debtors and creditors dealt with
one another across greater distances, as they would in a commercializing
economy, they found formal written credit instruments more suitable than
book accounts for their transactions-not always, to be sure, but far more
often than not.
The second measure-rates of contest-is a bit more elusive. My data
showed that the rate at which debtors contested their creditors' claims in
court declined throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, as debtors
increasingly appeared in court only to confess judgment or did not appear at
all and allowed judgment to go against them by default. The decline
affected all debt actions, but it was particularly pronounced among actions
on written credit instruments-so much so that by the 1730s debtors never
contested more than ten percent of the actions on written instruments
entered against them, and rarely more than six percent. By way of contrast,
the rate of contest in book-debt actions never fell below twenty-four
percent, and usually was much higher.4" I interpreted this extraordinary
apparent pusillanimity among note and bond debtors as a measure of how
effectively formal written credit instruments embodied the debtor's
obligation. Most actions on notes and bonds-all of the confessions of
judgment and an indeterminate number of the defaults-were not disputes
at all but rather fairly routine reductions of the debts to judgments. 41 This, I
argued, reflected a world of relations between debtors and creditors that
was rather different from the world of book debt.47
Priest's correlation between litigation volume and currency instability
suggests a more complete explanation for the sharp rise in the proportion of
uncontested debt actions, although she does not address the question
herself. Using her Plymouth County data, Priest argues that the volume of
debt litigation increased as a result of currency depreciation, legal tender
44. See MANN, supra note 2, at 41 n.72, 172-75 tbis.2-5.
45. See id. at 172 tbl.2.
46. When I presented my data in Neighbors and Strangers, I saw no need to distinguish
between confessions of judgment and defaults in appearance in uncontested actions, although I
had recorded them separately when I gathered the data. Confessions of judgment clearly constitute
an admission of liability. Defaults in appearance might simply represent a delaying tactic. To
check this latter possibility, I recently disaggregated my data on uncontested debt actions on
written credit instruments in the Hartford County Court for the 1730s and 1740s. In my sample
from the 1730s, confessions of judgment comprised 77% of the uncontested debt actions on notes
and bonds, and defaults in appearance 23%. In the next decade the proportions were 57% and
43%, respectively. None of the cases in which the debtor defaulted in appearance was continued,
reviewed, or appealed to another court session, which means that all uncontested actions-
whether confessions of judgment or defaults in appearance-were final admissions of liability by
the debtors. I leave it to others to speculate on the reasons for the shift in the proportions.
47. See MANN, supra note 2, at 39-41.
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laws, currency scarcity, and recession.' The first two gave debtors "an
incentive.., to default on payment agreements" and profit from the
continued depreciation until their creditors sued and won judgments.49 The
latter two rendered debtors "unable to raise funds to pay their debts,"
forcing their creditors to sue them.50 All four combined to boost the volume
of debt litigation. This is a plausible explanation, capturing as it does
various elements of economic and monetary distress. To nail it down, Priest
should adjust her litigation figures for population growth to measure the
rates of change more accurately, and she should examine her debt actions
more closely to determine whether the time that elapsed between when a
note or bond was due and when the creditor filed suit to collect it
lengthened or shortened, which would help her assess whether debtors were
in fact realizing depreciation gains by deferring payment.
Priest also should acknowledge that, just as creditors had reasons to sue
to collect unpaid debts, they also had ample reasons not to sue. As
numerous letters between lawyers and their creditor-clients make clear, the
expense and inconvenience of litigation, the power of debtors to delay
judgment, the paucity of property against which to execute a judgment, and
the frequent lack of a resale market for property that was seized all
discouraged creditors from suing.5 A fuller explanation for changes in
litigation volume may thus be a bit more complicated. Nonetheless, Priest's
argument is a promising start. It also suggests that not all of the uncontested
debt actions were routine reductions of debts to judgments, in effect
recording them for later collection. Many of them-and how many will
depend on data that neither of us has gathered-represented the legitimate
inability to pay of debtors who did not deny their liability. Both
explanations support my original conclusions about the significance of the
ability of formal written credit instruments to embody the debtor's
obligation more conclusively than book accounts.
Changes in debt litigation were just some of the legal changes I
identified and attempted to explain in Neighbors and Strangers. The others
included changes in pleading and procedure and in the role of juries, and
the growing formalism of nonlegal forms of disputing-arbitration and
church disciplinary proceedings.52 I wove them into an argument that law
and community diverged in the eighteenth century in ways that allowed
people from different communities to deal with one another within the
common framework of an integrated legal system. It is not clear to me
48. See Priest, supra note 1, at 1395.
49. Id. at 1386.
50. Id. at 1387.
51. I discuss the interplay between debtors and creditors when debts fell due at length in
chapter 1 of my forthcoming book, BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN
THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (forthcoming 2002).
52. See MANN, supra note 2, at 67-161.
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whether Priest disputes this interpretation, as she devotes her energies to
attacking arguments I did not make. Nonetheless, her analysis of currency
policies and litigation volume adds a useful strand to my interpretation of
legal change. Although I discussed the importance of paper money to
commercialization and the legal changes that accompanied it, Priest
examines currency issues in much greater detail than I did. Had she
recognized currency policy as part of a larger explanation of legal change,
rather than offering it as a single all-encompassing cause, her article would
have been more modest, but it would have made a genuine contribution by
adding texture and detail to our understanding of legal change in
eighteenth-century New England. Instead, she adopts an economist's
fixation on money supply and claims such complete explanatory authority
for it that, with no apparent self-consciousness, she even speculates that
slavery took the legal form it did because of "the scarcity of cash" 3 and
that the theological concepts of just price and usury were actually products
of "nonintegrated markets and market power." 54 Historians usually take a
broader, more nuanced approach to causation than that.5
The fit among law, economy, and society is imperfect at best. The
relationship among them is dynamic and ongoing. Historical causation is
difficult to determine with any precision. The best one can hope to attain is
a variant on the pilot's definition of a helicopter-two thousand bolts flying
in loose formation. The legal changes I described were merely trends. They
did not unfold smoothly, steadily, or inexorably. They did not sweep aside
or transform every legal, social, or economic relationship in their path.
Given the obvious complexity of the subject, I did not intend Neighbors
and Strangers to be the last word on legal change. I expected that others
would take up the inquiry and refine and even replace my explanations. I
welcome Priest's contributions, which I hope will be many, but before she
can replace my interpretation, she first has to address it, rather than tilting at
windmills of her own invention.
53. Priest, supra note 1, at 1312.
54. Id. at 1338.
55. It is ironic, given her criticism of me, that Priest's focus on money supply leads her into a
simplistic economic determinism that she might have avoided had she taken account of Margaret
Newell's insightful work on the causes, consequences, and context of economic development and
commercialization in colonial New England. See MARGARET ELLEN NEWELL, FROM
DEPENDENCY TO INDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC REVOLUTION IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND (1998)
[hereinafter NEWELL, FROM DEPENDENCY TO INDEPENDENCE]; Margaret E. Newell, A Revolution
in Economic Thought: Currency and Development in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in
ENTREPRENEURS: THE BOSTON BUSINESS COMMUNITY, 1700-1850, at 1 (Conrad Edick Wright
& Katheryn P. Viens eds., 1997). Paper money is a large part of Newell's story, but she never
treats it as an independent variable. Indeed, she is at pains to recognize that capitalism is, in her
words, "as much a cultural, political, and ideological system as it is an economic one," that the
emergence of market-oriented behavior and institutions are "contingencies to be explained," and
that any analysis of economic development must attend to "the relationship between culture and
economy." NEWELL, FROM DEPENDENCY TO INDEPENDENCE, supra, at 5-6.
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